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Affective states can change how people react to measures aimed at influencing their
decisions such as providing a default option. Previous research has shown that when
defaults maintain the status quo positive mood increases reliance on the default and
negative mood decreases it. Similarly, it has been demonstrated that positive mood
enhances the preference for inaction. We extend this research by investigating how
mood states influence reliance on the default if the default leads to a change, thus
pitting preference for status quo against a preference for inaction. Specifically, we
tested in an online study how happiness and sadness influenced reliance on two types
of default (1) a default maintaining status quo and (2) a default inducing change. Our
results suggest that the effect of emotions depends on the type of default: people in a
happy mood were more likely than sad people to follow a default when it maintained
status quo but less likely to follow a default when it introduced change. These results
are in line with mood maintenance theory.
Keywords: default bias, incidental emotions, status quo, mood induction.
1  Introduction
When introducing a new product, for instance a new cellphone plan, marketing
companies have different strategies at hand to influence customers. One powerful
instrument to influence people towards making a specific decision is to provide a
default option (Goldstein, Johnson, Herrmann, & Heitmann, 2008; Johnson, Bellman,
& Lohse, 2002). Default options are automatically chosen when individuals make no
active choice (Brown & Krishna, 2004). Defaults are sometimes considered as nudges
because they exert a substantial influence on choice without restricting decision
makers’ freedom to choose (Sunstein & Thaler, 2003). The differing rates of organ
donation across European countries provide an impressive example of the power of
defaults (Davidai, Gilovich, & Ross, 2012; Johnson, & Goldstein, 2003). Although
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria all grant their citizens the right to
freely decide whether they are willing to donate their organs in the case of a fatal
accident, the countries differ if the default is to be an organ donor (opt-out) or if the
default is not to donate (opt-in). In countries such as Germany and the Netherlands that
have an opt-in policy, organ donation rates are around 20\% (Johnson & Goldstein,
2003). In contrast, in Austria and Belgium where there is an opt-out policy, donation
rates frequently exceed 90\% (Davidai et al., 2012; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).
Although the power of defaults has been demonstrated in many areas ranging from
choices about retirement investments (Cronqvist & Thaler, 2004; Madrian & Shea,
2001) to energy suppliers (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) and consumer goods
(Goldstein et al., 2008), they do not always lead to the desired outcome. For instance,
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in 2007 Facebook launched a program that displayed members’ purchases by default,
forcing users to “opt-out” if they did not want to share their shopping history.
However, after an immense backlash from irate users, only nine days after the
program’s inception Facebook had to change the default so that users would have to
actively choose to participate (Goldstein et al., 2008).
Several theoretical explanations have been offered to account for the power of defaults
and that may provide insight into when people decide against a default. For one, it has
been suggested that default options are preferred because they are interpreted as
recommendations of the policy makers, suggesting a socially desired behavior
(McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006) or a choice designed to meet the
requirements of the average customer (Irwin & Baron, 2001). Secondly, defaults
frequently preserve the status quo. Research shows that people often make choices
such that the current state of the world remains intact. This preference has been named
the status quo bias (Masatlioglu & Ok, 2005; Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). For
instance, Hartman, Doane, and Woo (1991) found that people preferred their current
electricity service provider to other providers, even if these would provide a more
reliable or cheaper service. Thirdly, defaults are usually associated with absence of
physical or mental efforts. Making a decision can be effortful, particularly when people
do not have a preexisting preference (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Thus people may
use defaults heuristically to reduce the cognitive effort required to reach a decision. In
line with this, most people prefer options that do not require action as compared to
options they have to actively pursue, and a negative result that occurs as the
consequence of an action is often perceived as more reprehensible than a negative
result caused by an omission (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Prentice & Koehler, 2002; Ritov &
Baron, 1992).
All these theories can explain why people follow a default if it maintains the current
state of the world. However, if the default introduces a change, as in the Facebook
example, the status quo bias suggests that people should decide against the default. In
contrast, explaining a default choice in terms of a policy recommendation or a
preference for an omission suggests that people should follow the default even if it
induces change. Thus, depending on the mechanisms underlying the default choice, the
effectiveness of a default may hinge on whether it promotes the status quo or
introduces a change. Schweitzer (1994) provided evidence that the omission and the
status quo bias provide an independent, but similarly sized, influence on behavior (see
also Baron & Ritov, 1994). This suggests that defaults that introduce change should be
less effective than defaults that maintain the status quo. However, when pitting both
biases against each other Ritov and Baron (1992) found that people only preferred an
option that upheld the status quo as long as it was the result of inaction, but opted for
change when upholding the status quo required action. This suggests that the
effectiveness of a default option does not depend on whether it maintains or changes
the current state of the world. Following up on this issue, the first goal of the current
work is to investigate whether the effect of defaults is reduced when the default
introduces a change or maintains the status quo when the task involves real decisions.
2  The influence of emotions on default decisions
Emotions have been shown to exert an important influence on decision making in
general (Aspinwall, 1998; Cohen, Pham, & Andrade, 2007; Scheibehenne & von
Helversen, 2014) and on decisions involving a default specifically (Yen & Chuang,
2008; Garg, Inman & Mittal, 2005). Yen and Chuang (2008) showed that the
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probability with which people choose an option that upheld the status quo increased
with positive affect and decreased with negative affect. The same held true for the
option of choosing neither of two offered options (e.g., two apartments). In a similar
vein, Garg and colleagues (2005) showed that, in decisions with emotionally difficult
trade-offs, angry participants showed a stronger preference for the status quo than sad
participants. Here, we aim to extend their research by testing how positive and negative
affect influence how frequently a default is accepted if the default introduces a change
and thus pits the preference for the status quo against the preference for inaction.
Two prominent theories, directly related to the present research, provide an explanation
of how emotions influence decision-making: the “affect-as-information” theory and the
“mood-maintenance” theory. These theories yield predictions on how affect will
interact with the two types of defaults.
2.1  Affect-as-information theory
The affect-as-information theory predicts how emotions and moods influence
information processing. Specifically, it suggests that people use their current affective
condition to evaluate the state of the world and if their current mode of thinking is
appropriate (Hunsinger, Isbell & Clore, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). For example,
negative affect may signal that the situation is problematic and therefore the current
dominant response should be abandoned in favor of a more careful and systematic
processing of the available information (Bless et al., 1996). In support of this theory,
people in a negative mood have been found to rely less on strategies that are often
triggered automatically such as scripts and stereotypes (Bless et al., 1996;
Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) and to process substantive information more
carefully (Sinclair, Mark, & Clore, 1994). In this vein, Garg and colleagues (2005)
suggested that individuals in a sad mood tend to consider options more closely and
show relatively little bias towards the status quo.
According to the affect-as-information theory, positive affect may signal that the
situation is benign, which permits to follow the currently dominant course of action. In
line with this, past research has found that positive mood induces a less effortful and
more superficial processing of information (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990;
Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi, 1994; Park & Banaji, 2000). Furthermore, positive
emotions have been shown to increase reliance on global knowledge structures such as
scripts (Bless et al., 1996), stereotypes (Bodenhausen et al., 1994), and judgmental
heuristics (Ruder & Bless, 2003) and decrease the depth with which people process
substantive information in persuasion and attitude formation (Batra & Stayman, 1990;
Mackie & Worth, 1989).
In some situations, the default option may induce a strong emotional reaction that
could serve as a dominant response. However, research suggests that relying on the
default is usually the dominant course of action (e.g. Goldstein, et al., 2008; Johnson,
et al., 2002; Ritov & Baron, 1992), and thus may serve as a global knowledge structure
or script people can follow (Yen & Chuang, 2008). In contrast, deciding against a
default is generally perceived as a decision against the dominant response and has been
characterized as requiring more systematic processing of information and more effort
(Garg, et al. 2005; McKenzie et al., 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Yen &
Chuang, 2008). Thus, to the degree that going with the default is the dominant
response in the task, according to the affect-as-information theory, positive affect
should increase reliance on defaults, independent of whether the default is maintaining
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the status quo or introducing a change.
2.2  Mood-maintenance theory
In contrast, the “mood-maintenance” theory emphasizes the importance of emotion
regulation and its influence on decision-making. Specifically, it posits that people are
motivated to experience positive affect (Aspinwall, 1998; Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen,
1984). Accordingly, people in a positive mood may strive to maintain this affective
state by choosing options that promise positive consequences (Wegener & Petty, 1994)
and by avoiding losses and high-risk options (Arkes, Herren, & Isen, 1988; Isen &
Geva, 1987). People in a negative mood may be motivated to “repair” their mood, for
example by choosing options that they believe will improve their mood, such as
hedonic goods (Garg, Wansink, & Inman, 2007, but see Wegener & Petty, 1994). This
suggests that people in a positive mood may prefer options that maintain the status quo,
because they are seen as less threatening (Riis & Schwarz, 2003) and thus allow
maintaining positive affect. In contrast, people in a negative mood may prefer a new
option to the status quo because it has the potential to uplift their emotional state. For
instance, Lin and Lin (2009) found that when choosing between hedonic goods such as
food items, people show more variety-seeking behavior during a negative than a
positive mood. This also resonates with the finding by Yen & Chuang (2008) that
people in a negative mood are less willing to choose a status quo option, whereas
people in a positive mood are more likely to choose a status quo option.
Correspondingly, the mood-maintenance theory predicts that people in a positive mood
should rely more on a default if it leads to upholding the current state of the world, but
rely less on a default when it involves change. In contrast, in a negative mood people
should rely more on a default that involves change and less on a default that leads to
maintaining the status quo.
2.3  The present research
The lack of empirical evidence how mood influences decisions in situations where the
status quo bias and the omission bias are pitted against each other prompted us to
conduct an experiment that involved real choices in which we manipulated
participants’ mood and then presented them with a choice situation where following a
default either maintained the status quo or introduced a change.
3  Method
3.1  Participants
A total of 336 participants residing in the US were recruited from the online labor
market Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) in exchange for a payment of $1. Previous
studies ascertained the reliability of Mturk to obtain high-quality data (Buhrmester,
Kwang, Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, Ipeirotis, 2010). Completing the study
required approximately 15 minutes. Twenty-three participants did not pass the control
questions that checked whether they had read the instructions and thus were excluded
from the analysis. The final sample consisted of 179 men and 134 women, with a mean
age of M = 33.75 years (range 18–66). The majority of participants (about 80\%) were
White American, with the remaining 20\% indicating Hispanic (6\%), African
American (6\%), Asian, and Native American origins. All research was conducted in
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compliance with APA ethical standards.
Table 1: Number of participants in each condition.
  Happy (N=105) Neutral (N=101) Sad (N=107)
Status quo by default (N=105) 34 35 36
Change by default (N=103) 36 32 35
No default (N=105) 35 34 36
3.2  Design and Procedure
The study used a 3 x 3 between-subjects experimental design varying induced affect
(happy, neutral, and sad) and the type of default (“Status quo by default”, “Change by
default”, and “No default”). The type of default was manipulated by presenting
participants with a choice between two visual perception tasks. Specifically,
participants could choose whether they would like to work on a task they had worked
on before or work on a new task. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the
nine conditions, resulting in about 30 participants in each condition (see Table 1).
After giving their consent to participate in the study, participants received instructions
about the experimental task and filled out a questionnaire measuring demographics and
their current mood. Additionally, we included control questions to ensure that
participants were paying attention to the instructions. Next, participants were randomly
assigned to one of the two visual perception tasks. Once they had completed 15 items
of the first task, we manipulated participants’ mood state by showing them a 3 min
movie clip, a standard procedure to induce different affective states (Schaefer, Nils,
Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). After
watching the movie clip, participants were asked to answer a few questions regarding
the content of the movie and to again rate their current mood. Next, participants had to
choose whether they wanted to continue working on the same task as before or on a
new task. This choice was our main dependent variable. Instructions for that choice
differed depending on the experimental condition. In the “no default” control
condition, participants were presented with the two options next to each other and had
to select the option they preferred before they could move on by pressing the
“continue” button. The order in which the options were presented was
counterbalanced. In the “status quo by default” condition, participants were told that
they would work on the same task as before if they pressed the “continue” button but
that they could opt out and work on a new task if they checked a box before they
pressed “continue”. In the “change by default” condition, participants were told that
they would work on a new task if they pressed the “continue” button but that they
could opt out and work on the same task as before if they checked a box before they
pressed “continue”. After they had completed the second visual perception task,
participants were again asked to rate their mood.
3.3  Materials
Tasks.
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Both tasks involved the visual processing of information. We chose visual perception
problems because they are comparable to tasks that are offered on Amazon Mechanical
Turks. One task involved counting trees. In this task, participants had to indicate how
many trees were shown on a series of the photos depicting nature scenes. In the other
task, participants saw photos of different types of buildings (i.e., churches, restaurants,
shops) and they had to provide a one-word “tag” for each photo that best described the
type of building shown. Both tasks were counterbalanced to allow us to control the
relative preference for the two tasks.
Mood induction.
Mood was induced through short video clips taken from Youtube.com. Participants in
the neutral condition saw a 3 min clip from a documentary about Norway informing
about historical facts and local customs, in the positive condition they saw a clip with a
compilation of the funniest moments in the comedy movie Ice Age 2: The Meltdown
(2006), and in the negative condition they saw a clip from the film City of Angels
(1998, 01:38–01:41) depicting the death of the main character.
Mood questionnaire.
To measure participants’ mood state we asked them to rate their current mood on 10
items taken from the expanded version of the “Positive and Negative Affect Schedule”
(PANAS-X, Watson & Clark, 1999) and the “Differential Emotions Scale” (DES-IV;
Izard, Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993) using a 5-point answer scale (1=very slightly,
5=extremely). Specifically, we used 3 items to measure happiness (glad, happy and
joyful), 3 items to measure sadness (downhearted, sad and gloomy) and 4 further items
to measure anger, anxiety, curiosity and excitement (angry, jittery, curious, and
excited). Participants rated their mood states 3 times: at the beginning of the
experiment, after the mood induction, and at the end of the experiment.
Figure 1: Number of participants in neutral mood condition (N=101) that choose
to stay with the same task or to change to the new task in the three “type of
default” conditions.
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4  Results
A chi-square test indicated that the random assignment to one of the two visual
perception tasks at the beginning of the experiment had no significant influence on
choice, χ 2 (1, 313) = 0.27, p = .60. Therefore, we merged the two conditions for the
subsequent data analyses.
4.1  Influence of different types of defaults
As an initial test to see whether the default was more effective when it maintained the
status quo than when it introduced a change, we focused only on participants in the
neutral condition (N = 101). For this group, the default condition had a strong influence
on choice as indicated by a chi-square test: χ 2 (1, 101) = 33.42, p < .001. As
illustrated in Figure 1, in the “status quo by default” condition 83\% of participants
chose to stay with the same task, whereas only 13\% did so in the “change by default”
condition. This suggests that the default was effective regardless of whether it
maintained the status quo or introduced a change. In the “no default” condition,
participants were equally likely to choose the same task as before (44\%) or to choose a
new task (56\%), showing no evidence for a status quo bias.
Figure 2: Level of happiness and sadness for each mood condition and for each
of the three measurement time points: at the beginning of the experiment, after
the mood induction and at the end of the experiment. Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
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4.2  Influence of incidental emotions on participants’ choices
In a next step we analyzed the influence of mood state on participants’ choices. We first
report results of the manipulation check of the mood induction and then how mood
influenced participants’ choices when presented with different types of defaults.
Manipulation check.
We created two scales to determine participants’ happiness and sadness by averaging
the ratings of the respective items at the three measurement points (Cronbach’s α > .82
for both scales at all time points).
As illustrated in Figure 2, after the mood induction participants in the happy condition
were happy (M = 3.27; SD = 0.95) and not sad (M = 1.12; SD = 0.37), participants in
the neutral condition were somewhat less happy (M = 2.78; SD = 0.94) and also not
sad (M =1.2; SD = 0.45), and participants in the sad condition were not very happy (M
= 1.72; SD = 0.83) and moderately sad (M = 2.52; SD = 1.10). These data are in line
with the intended manipulation of mood although in absolute terms, no extreme levels
of emotions were induced.
Table 2: Logistic regression analyses predicting following default behavior.
    95\% CI for odds ratio
Predictors B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper p-value
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Constant 0.88 (0.55)       .11
Mood 1.26 (0.67) 0.95 3.51 12.98 .06
Default type 0.35 (0.36) 0.70 1.42 2.91 .33
Default type by mood −0.97 (0.44) 0.16 0.38 0.90 .03
Note: N=208, R2(Nagelkerke)= .05. Model χ2(1) = 6.12, p = .11.
To test for differences among the experimental conditions, we ran a repeated-measures
analysis of variance with mood condition as a between-subjects factor and
measurement time as a within-subject factor on the happiness and sadness ratings,
using Greenhouse–Geisser corrections of the degrees of freedom if necessary. This
analysis indicated a significant main effect of mood condition for happiness, F(2, 310)
= 27.77, p < .001, and for sadness, F(2, 310) = 59.08, p < .001. Post hoc Tukey’s HSD
tests revealed that participants in the happy condition were happier than participants in
the sad condition, (p < .001), and in the neutral condition, (p = .003). In the same vein,
participants in the sad condition were sadder than participants in the happy condition (p
< .001), and the neutral condition (p < .001). Significant interactions of mood with
measurement time indicated that ratings of happiness, F(3.56, 551.26) = 50.33, p < .01,
and of sadness, F(3.73, 578.54) = 67.05, p < .01, changed over time depending on the
mood condition. Importantly, follow up analyses showed that in the happy condition
participants became more happy, F(1,104) = 10.71 p = .001, and less sad, F(1,104) =
12.50, p = .001, after the mood manipulation. In contrast, in the sad condition,
participants became less happy, F(1,106) = 112, 78, p < .001, and more sad (F(1,106) =
115.61, p < .001, whereas in the neutral condition mood did not change (ps > .18).
Pairwise contrasts after the mood induction confirmed that participants were happier in
the happy condition as compared to the sad condition, Contrast = 1.55, SE = 0.12, p <
.001, and the neutral condition, Contrast = 0.49, SE = 0.13, p < .001. Similarly,
participants in the sad condition were sadder as compared to the happy condition,
Contrast = 1.40, SE = 0.10, p < .001, and the neutral condition, Contrast = 1.31, SE =
0.10, p < .001. These results suggest that the mood manipulation was successful.
The mood induction also influenced excitement and anger. Post hoc Scheffé tests
comparing the three mood conditions after the mood induction showed that participants
in the sad condition reported being less excited (ps < .001) and curious (ps < .001), but
more angry (ps < .001) than participants in the neutral or happy condition. Participants
in the happy condition were more excited than participants in the neutral condition (p =
.004), but did not differ from them in their ratings of anger and curiosity. There were
no differences in how jittery participants felt. Mean and standard deviations of all
affect measures can be found in the Appendix.
Figure 3: Proportion of participants following the default by type of default and
mood condition. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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Influence of incidental emotions on following a default.
To analyze whether participants’ mood states influenced their choices of defaults
preserving the status quo and defaults introducing a change, we ran a logistic
regression on participants’ choices with mood condition (happy, neutral and sad), type
of default (“status quo by default” and “change by default”), and their interaction as
predictors.
As shown in Figure 3, we found a main effect of mood on the likelihood to follow a
default, qualified by a significant interaction between the type of default and the
induced mood, b = −0.97, Wald χ2(1, 208) = 4.8, p = .03 (see also Table 2), suggesting
that the effect of mood depended on the type of default: Participants in a positive mood
were more likely to follow a default maintaining the status quo, whereas sad
participants were more likely to follow a default introducing change. Additional
analyses for each type of default showed that mood affected whether participants
followed the default in the change by default condition, b = −0.68, SE = 0.33, Wald
χ2(1,103) = 4.12, p = .04, but not in the status quo by default condition, b = 0.29, SE =
0.29, Wald χ2(1,105) = 1.01, p = .32.
A follow-up analysis showed that participants in the neutral condition did not differ
from participants in the sad condition (default status quo: χ 2 (1, 71) = 1.75, p = .19,
default change: χ 2 (1, 67) = 0.02, p = .89) or participants in the positive condition
(default status quo: χ 2 (1, 61) = 0.13, p = .71; default change: χ 2 (1, 68) = 3.21, p =
.07).
5  Discussion
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The main goal of this paper was to investigate how the choice to follow different types
of defaults is affected by incidental affect. We found that the effect of mood depended
on the type of default. In particular, when defaults introduced a change, participants
were more likely to follow it when in a sad mood than when in a happy mood. In
contrast, when the default maintained the status quo the opposite pattern was found.
These results extend the research by Yen and Chuang (2008) and Garg et al. (2005) to a
situation where the status quo bias and the omission bias are pitted against each other
and real consequences follow — even if the consequences are of relatively little
importance. Yen and Chuang (2008) reported that positive mood increased the status
quo and the tendency not to choose either of the offered options, whereas sadness
decreased both effects. When the default maintained the status quo and thus a
preference for an omission and a preference for the status quo were aligned, we found
a similar pattern. However, when the default induced a change, we found that people in
the happy condition were more likely to continue with the old task than sad
participants — even though it forced them to go against the default. This suggests that
the effect of mood on status quo may persist in the face of more effortful processing.
Participants in a positive and a negative mood did not differ significantly from
participants in a neutral mood. In particular, neither participants in the happy condition
were more likely to follow a default introducing a status quo nor were sad participants
more likely to follow a default that induced a change than participants in a neutral
mood. However, the percentage of people following a default in the neutral condition
was already very high, suggesting that the lack of difference could be caused by a
ceiling effect.
Overall, our results are in line with the idea that mood-maintenance considerations
influence choices involving defaults. Specifically they resonate with the idea that
people make decisions to reach or maintain a positive affective state (e.g., Garg et al.,
2007; Isen, 1984). In line with Lin and Lin (2009) who showed that people in a sad
mood are more willing to try out new alternatives than people in a positive mood, we
found that sad people more frequently chose to follow the default when it introduced a
new option. These results extend the research by Lin and Lin (2009) and Garg et al.
(2007) by showing that a mood related preference for new alternatives can even be
found in the presence of defaults, one of the most potent nudges identified in the
literature. Furthermore, they suggest that mood maintenance concerns can also
influence decisions involving options with a low hedonic value.
The degree to which mood-maintenance concerns determine participants’ choices may,
however, depend on the options that are introduced by a default. When the default
introduced a change in our task participants would work on a new task on which they
had only little information and thus could hope that it would improve their mood. In
contrast, if the default would introduce a change to a familiar but undesirable option,
mood-maintenance concerns should not increase reliance on the default.
In terms of the affect-as-information theory, our results suggest that mood states did
not influence how much people relied on the default as a global heuristic to make the
decision. On the one hand this could suggest that the “affect-as-information” theory
played only a minor role in participants’ decisions. According to this theory, positive
affect signals that the current environment is safe and it is possible to rely on the
currently active thinking mode, whereas negative affect signals that a careful analysis
of provided information is required and the currently active thinking style should be
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abandoned (Bless & Fiedler, 2006; Hunsinger et al., 2012). Thus, to the degree that
defaults are the dominant response, happy participants should have a stronger
preference for the default option than sad participants regardless of the type of default.
However, in our study we found that when the default introduced change, sad
participants were more likely to follow the default than happy participants. On the
other hand, it is possible that people used other affective cues than the default to guide
their choices. For instance, mood and emotions can influence how much people rely on
task related affect (e.g. Garg et al., 2005). Thus, if the task itself provides a strong
negative cue and people rely more on affective cues in positive mood, this could
influence participants’ choices against the default in positive mood. In our task this
seems not very likely though because in the condition without a default participants
were equally likely to switch tasks, suggesting that both tasks were similar attractive or
tedious. Nevertheless, in future it would be useful to measure task related affect such
as how difficult, tedious, or attractive the tasks were perceived. This would allow
ruling out this hypothesis and to test more directly whether participants switched tasks
in order to improve their mood.
Our results indicate a strong effect of the default that was independent on the specific
type of default. Eighty-three percent of subjects chose the default option when it
promoted the status quo and 87\% subjects chose the default when it promoted change.
These results suggest that the status quo bias played no or only a minor role for choices
involving defaults. This resonates with research showing that people often prefer
inaction over action when making decisions (e.g., Asch et al., 1994; DeScioli,
Christner, & Kurzban, 2011). Our results also provide further evidence to support the
idea that the omission bias is largely responsible for the effect of defaults on choice
(Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov & Baron, 1992). One reason that participants followed the
default to such a strong degree could be that both tasks were similarly attractive.
Indeed, when no default was provided participants were roughly equally likely to
choose the same task as before or to choose the new task. Furthermore, participants
only had to work on the tasks for a short time, which could have decreased the
importance of the decision. This relatively low importance of the task may have
hindered the development of a status quo bias and it may have increased reliance on
the default. Future research should replicate our results with more consequential and
emotionally involving decisions.
In sum, our results suggest that defaults have a strong influence on choice even if they
are used to introduce a change; however, this influence may differ depending on
decision makers’ emotional state. Whereas, defaults maintaining the status quo are
chosen more frequently in a positive mood, defaults inducing a change may be more
easily accepted in a sad mood.
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Appendix: Overview of the affect measures
Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for the affect measures in the three mood
conditions: at the Beginning of the experiment – after the mood induction – at the end
of the experiment.
Scale Statistics    Happy (N=105)      Neutral (N=101)      Sad (N=107)
Happiness Means    3.05 – 3.27 – 2.97      2.73 – 2.78 – 2.58      2.77 – 1.72 – 2.17
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  SD    1.02 – 0.95 – 1.06      0.89 – 0.94 – 1.01      1.00 – 0.83 – 0.84
Sadness Means    1.25 – 1.12 – 1.12      1.25 – 1.20 – 1.17      1.51 – 2.52 – 1.80
  SD    0.55 – 0.37 – 0.36      0.54 – 0.45 – 0.47      0.84 – 1.10 – 0.90
Angry Means    1.14 – 1.11 – 1.10      1.11 – 1.13 – 1.08      1.28 – 1.44 – 1.30
  SD    0.54 – 0.42 – 0.44      0.45 – 0.44 – 0.37      0.80 – 0.86 – 0.77
Jittery Means    1.45 – 1.30 – 1.38      1.33 – 1.29 – 1.27      1.50 – 1.41 – 1.40
  SD    0.78 – 0.59 – 0.75      0.62 – 0.65 – 0.65      0.91 – 0.81 – 0.80
Curios Means    2.86 – 2.65 – 2.44      2.74 – 2.93 – 2.46      2.92 – 2.01 – 2.06
  SD    1.14 – 1.21 – 1.13      1.01 – 1.15 – 1.15      1.09 – 1.03 – 1.04
Excited Means    2.46 – 2.70 – 2.33      2.22 – 2.24 – 1.99      2.38 – 1.55 – 1.67
  SD    1.11 – 1.17 – 1.17      1.07 – 1.10 – 1.09      1.00 – 0.72 – 0.86
*
Experimental Psychology, University of Mannheim, Schloss EO, 68131
Mannheim, Germany. Email: yshevche@mail.uni-mannheim.de.
#
Department of Psychology, University of Basel, Switzerland.
This research was supported by a Swiss Government Scholarship awarded to the
first author (ESKAS-Nr: 2012.0104), a Swiss National Science Foundation
Research Grant (No. 100014_146169) to the second author, and a Swiss National
Science Foundation Research Grant (No. 100014_130149) to the third author. We
would like to thank Laura Wiles for editing the manuscript.
Copyright: © 2014. The authors license this article under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.
This document was translated from LATEX by HEVEA.
Change and status quo in decisions with defaults: The effect of i... http://journal.sjdm.org/13/13722/jdm13722.html
17 von 17 03.03.17 12:00
